Smart small states provide lessons for Gulf tech ambitions
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admin
- May 19, 2026
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In recent years, Gulf states have worked hard to turn their home region into a hub for digital innovation and investment in AI, cloud computing and clean-tech. The region has also established itself as one of the world’s fastest-growing destinations for the data centres and other types of digital infrastructure. This makes it a useful and timely exercise to consider how smaller state actors in other parts of the world have undertaken similar projects to become important tech players on the international stage. Two excellent examples are Ireland and Singapore. Neither has access to the energy resources of the Gulf states. But like smaller states in the Gulf they are acutely aware of both the limitations and opportunities of their smallness. Since the early 2000s, decision-makers in Ireland and Singapore have prioritised their tech sectors as a way to overcome the limits of their small domestic economies and populations to build capacity and diversify their economies. In doing so, both states have leveraged geographic location — Ireland between the US, UK and Europe; Singapore between the Straits of Malacca and South China Sea. They have also championed economic openeness, and built tech-savvy educated workforces that attract talent from all over the world. These moves have been supported by new regulatory frameworks, special economic zones, and cross-border agreements to maintain competitive advantage. In economic terms, the results have been impressive. Ireland serves as the European base for 16 of the top 20 global tech companies. The tech sector accounts for around $50bn annually, over 13% of the country’s GDP, and employs roughly 120,000 workers. For Singapore the numbers are even bigger. With a total of S$128.1bn value-added, tech accounts for 18.6% of GDP and employs 214,000 workers. This tech success has not only increased economic competitiveness, efficiency, and resilience. It has also resulted in the routing of global flows of information as well as capital through both countries. Singapore has more data cables landing on its territory than any other country in Southeast Asia. Three-quarters of all cables in the northern hemisphere pass through or near Irish waters, and four transatlantic cables directly connect with Ireland. This has significant geopolitical as well as economic implications. Not least, it makes the subsea infrastructures of Ireland and Singapore strategically important components of the international security system. This has enabled both countries to extend their political, as well as economic, reach beyond existing territorial and physical limitations. In turn, this has helped them offset some of the political vulnerabilities of smallness. But tech success also raises important challenges related to energy security, environmental management and tech geopolitics. The energy demands of building a state-of-the-art digital infrastrucure are massive. A single hyperscale facility can require the same amount of energy as a small town. Tech infrastructure also takes up large amounts of other vital resources including water. It also monopolises the use of precious space, a real concern in small states. The energy resources and financial power of the Gulf states position them well to address the energy security and environmental challenges associated with tech-leadership. But even in the Gulf, the building of a cutting edge digital infrastructure requires hard financial choices and the commitment of large amounts of energy. It also requires next-generation cooling systems that operate efficiently in hot weather. On the geopolitical level, the roles of Ireland and Singapore as regional gateways for the flow of data has located both countries at the centre of US-Chinese technology rivalry. It has also entangled them in tech geopolitics and governance issues relating to the control and use of data. The experiences of both Ireland and Singapore in becoming tech strongholds offers some guidance for other state actors, including Gulf states, on all of these issues. First, their tech journeys demonstrate the importance of social and human capital, innovation, learning and adaptation for attracting high levels of inward investment and diversification into tech. The messae is clear. Even in a world of de-globalisation and resource nationalism, smaller actors that effectively use their national development plans to establish themsevles as innovative ‘hubs’ and ‘gateways’ will attract significant tech opprotunties. Both cases also highlight the close connection between trans-formative tech and US-China great power competition. Ireland and Singapore have had some success in navigating this challenge. In particular, they have presented themselves as neutral third parties that are ‘neither pro-China nor pro-America,’ as the Singaporean government put it in 2024. For example, Ireland has repeatedly used the courts to block US access to Irish data centres and has fined Meta over data transfers to the US. Attracted by Ireland’s reputation for strict data protection laws and keen to counter claims of Chinese state surveillance, TikTok’s ‘Project Clover’ relocated its European user data to an Irish centre. Singapore has not only eagerly signed agreements with both the US and China on cooperation in the fields of data analytics and AI. It has also developed a legal regime for tech that takes into account Chinese protectionism and US surveillance, as a way to attract major tech firms from both countries. Such strategies have enabled Ireland and Singapore to present themselves as tech gatekeepers as well as gateways. This adds to their influence in regional affairs and their reputation and standing on the international stage. This could not be more relevant for smaller states in the highly contested Gulf region. China and the US already use technology in the Gulf as a form of statecraft. It is inevitable that going forward both great powers and ambitious regional players will look to use the emerging tech eco-system to shape regional geopolitics and security in their favour. For all these reasons, the cases of Ireland and Singapore provide valuable lessons for the Gulf states in their transition from buyers to suppliers of technology and key players in the global tech revolution. The writer is Professor of International Politics and Director of the Small States and Energy Studies Programs at Georgetown University. @RoryDavidMiller
