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It is a much-publicised and loudly proclaimed fact that US President Donald Trump is a climate change denier and he is proud of his ill-informed position. Ever since he became president for the second time
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After nearly four decades in Britain, Ali Haydor says there are now days when he wishes he could hide his brown skin. Violent protests erupted in his home city of Southampton after a British-born Sikh,
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I have been a huge fan of Kareena Kapoor Khan for years. She is one of Bollywood's most bankable and celebrated female stars. When it comes to versatility in acting, Kareena's name is always among
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One year after lifting its long-standing two-child limit, Vietnam is offering incentives for people to have more babies as the communist country risks getting old before it gets rich. A new population law and regulations
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There is something quietly telling about a nation the size of Qatar committing €295mn to a satellite that will not fly until 2030. It is not the sum itself — modest by the standards of sovereign wealth — but the horizon it implies. Es’hail-3, the Turksat-Biruni spacecraft sealed into existence yesterday through agreements between Es’hailSat, Turkiye’s Turksat, and France’s Thales Alenia Space, is less a piece of hardware than a statement of intent: that Qatar sees its future not only beneath the Gulf’s waters, but above the atmosphere, in the invisible architecture of bandwidth that will define the next century’s power. It is worth pausing on what this satellite is not. Es’hailSat’s earlier ventures were built substantially for broadcasting. Es’hail-3 is something else: a Ka-band, software-defined platform designed to dynamically reallocate coverage and bandwidth on demand, serving aviation, maritime, government and enterprise clients from Africa’s Atlantic edge to Central Asia. The prime minister’s presence at the signing was not ceremonial decoration; it signalled that this is being read in Doha as sovereign infrastructure, strategic and largely invisible to the people it will serve. That invisibility deserves reflection. The great infrastructural investments of any era rarely announce themselves in the moment — cables, fibre backbones, orbital slots negotiated years ahead. What Qatar is purchasing, alongside Turkiye and French engineering, is presence: a guaranteed seat at 50 degrees East from which to project connectivity across three continents. There is a partnership logic here too. Pooling Es’hailSat’s and Turksat’s assets and ground infrastructure reflects a recognition that even ambitious middle powers now build reach through alliance, not solitary grandeur — a response, as Turksat’s chief put it, to a fast-changing market rather than mere bilateral goodwill. And there is a deeper question of self-image. A country built on hydrocarbons drawn from the seabed is now investing heavily in infrastructure answering to no seabed at all. Es’hailSat’s own language — “sovereign control over critical communications infrastructure” — reveals an anxiety as much as an ambition, about dependence in an unstable region extending beyond energy into the unglamorous business of who controls the signal. Satellites are built for decades, not news cycles. In committing to one now, Qatar is betting on a world it expects to still need connecting long after this week’s headlines fade.
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The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. Speaking after a US-GCC ministerial meeting last week, GCC Secretary-General Jassim Mohammed al-Budaiwi was clear that any future regional security arrangements must take into account the interests and security needs of GCC member states. Statements like this by senior officials inevitably raise the question of the future role of the six-member GCC in the post-war regional order. Specifically, it raises the question of the whether the GCC, which celebrated its 45th anniversary last month, can or should transform into a security and defence alliance or rebrand as a conflict mediation framework that can resolve, if not prevent, regional crises as they happen. In theory at least, regional organisations like the GCC do provide members with opportunities to work together to address shared challenges. But there are limits to what regional organisations — whether in the Gulf, Europe, Asia, or anywhere else — can achieve as frameworks primarily focused on providing security or delivering peace. The 55-member African Union has regularly deployed military, as well as civilian, resources across its home continent to manage crises. The EU has done the same on the Union’s borders and, at times, further afield in parts of Africa and Asia. These are the exceptions not the norm. Of the estimated 300 regional organisations active today, very few have the legal authority, political will or institutional and operational capabilities to enforce existing peace agreements. Even fewer use force to restore peace, never mind undertake more pro-active security operations intended to defend or achieve the organisation’s core interests. In the first place, regional organisations are “meeting places” for member states not independent entities free to act as they choose on matters of security and peace. In the EU, for example, ultimate decision-making on these issues requires the unanimous agreement of member states through the EU Council. What complicates matters further is that members usually have different, and often competing, values and beliefs. They also tend to prioritise different interests, and disagree with each other over what threats deserve the most attention. It is only on those rare occasions when the security interests of members converge that regional organisations can mobilise to undertake security operations. But even this requires members to share a vision of the benefits of acting together, as occcured with the GCC in Bahrain in 2011 during the Arab Spring. Once the specific threat subsides, members again opt for sovereigty over security cooperation inside the regional organisation. The doctrine of non-intervention in domestic affairs is intended to protect the sovereignty of member states. It makes it especially challenging for regional organisations to act in peace and security. It is the foundational principle of ASEAN, which includes Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia among its members. It is also a core value of most other regional organisations, including the 81-year old Arab League, one of the world’s oldest. Non-intervention is not cost-free. It can impact on the credibility and legitimacy of regional organisations, especially when they refuse to respond to regional conflicts that result in humanitarian crises or atrocities. But the doctrine of non-intervention also plays an important role in building trust and sustaining regional organisations during challenging times. It reduces the likelihood that disagreements spill over and undermine cooperation between members on issues where interests overlap. For example, following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) collapsed because members – Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and North Yemen – aligned on opposite sides of the crisis. The non-intervention doctrine also demands shared, or at least consensus-based, decision-making. This makes it harder for bigger members, with larger economies and armies, to impose their preferences on smaller partners. It also allows smaller actors to gain disproportionate influence relative to their size. For example, an April survey of ASEAN opinion leaders ranked Singapore as the most influential and effective member ahead of Indonesia — home to the bloc’s biggest population, economy, and army. Smaller members can use their available resources and expertise to promote their policy preferences to shape, and even set, the regional agenda. They can also lobby other members to back their the policy preferences or convince them to join with them in collective action to fight for common peace and security goals. This “multiplier effect” is a very important instrument of power for smaller actors inside regional organisations. This is how Sweden, despite the opposition of larger members, won its fight for the inclusion of a civilian crisis management mechanism — the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict — in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). It is also how Ireland convinced the EU to fully back its two national priorities during the EU-UK Brexit negotations: blocking a hard border between the north and south of the country, and protecting the 1998 Good Friday peace agreement. Smaller member states also use the “multiplier effect” within the regional organisation to play an oversized role in external mediation and multiparty negotiations. Some examples include Ghana, Gambia and Togo in West Africa’s ECOWAS; Guyana and Suriname in CARICOM in the Caribbean; and Uruguay within Mercorsur, the Brazil-dominated South American common market. Disillusioned states all over the world are currently searching for new peace and security mechanisms to counter rising uncertainty, instability, and disorder. Regional organisations, including the GCC, are unlikely to meet those needs. But that does not reduce their value. They provide a safe space for building trust and nurturing collective problem solving among neighbours. They can empower smaller members to play a role in regional affairs and they can add legitimacy and credibility to the values and interests of those inside the organisation. In today’s evolving geopolitical environment, these all help to reduce regional conflict and increase opportunities for peacemaking.The writer is Professor of International Politics and Director of the Small States and Energy Studies Programmes at Georgetown Univeristy in Qatar@RoryDavidMiller
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Workers load the dismantled tents onto a truck at the dispaced families’ camp along the waterfront area in Beirut on Wednesday. (AFP) When Joseph Aoun, Lebanon’s president, appeared on television in the spring and asked why his country could not negotiate “to save the homes that have not yet been destroyed,” it was not the voice of a leader bargaining from strength. It was a plea. By then Israel’s renewed war on Hizbullah, which began on March 2nd, had driven some 1.2m people from their homes — more than a fifth of Lebanon’s population — and killed more than 4,000. Israeli bulldozers were erasing border villages one by one, in what many Lebanese saw as the Gaza plan moved north: more than 40,000 homes in the south destroyed, whole towns wiped from the map. Beirut’s call for talks went unanswered for weeks. That it was answered at all owed less to Beirut than to Washington. Donald Trump’s inner circle on the Middle East is unusually Lebanese. His envoy to Turkey, Tom Barrack, descends from emigrants from Zahle; his ambassador to Lebanon, Michel Issa, is Lebanese-American; and his in-law and adviser Massad Boulos, whose son married Trump’s daughter Tiffany, was born in Lebanon. The couple’s first child — Trump’s grandson, with a Lebanese-American father — arrived in 2025. Sentiment aside, Trump had a colder reason to act. Israel’s bombing of Beirut threatened to wreck a larger prize: his deal to end the war with Iran. He leaned on Binyamin Netanyahu to stop. The strategy was to deny Iran its Lebanese arm. Rather than let Tehran fold Lebanon into the terms of its own ceasefire, Trump chose to back the government in Beirut, which insisted that it alone had the right to speak for the country. The trouble was that the government had little to speak with. The Aoun-Salam administration, in office only since early 2025, had spent its entire mandate managing a war it did not start and could not stop. It had never been free to govern. Weak hands rarely win at the table, and Lebanon’s were very weak. The United States set the talks in motion and hosted them in Washington, where Secretary of State Marco Rubio steered five rounds of negotiation. By the time they began, Israel occupied roughly a fifth of Lebanese territory and more than a million Lebanese were displaced. Worse for Beirut, it played its hand alone. The 2026 war with Iran had swallowed the Gulf. Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz pushed Brent crude above $120 a barrel at its peak; the International Energy Agency called it the largest supply disruption in the history of the oil market. Gulf states faced shortages of food and even water. The Gulf Co-operation Council, normally Lebanon’s deepest pocket and loudest patron, was fighting for its own economic life. Lebanon’s gamble was a solitary one. The result, signed on June 26th, reads like a text written in Israel and pressed on Lebanon by Rubio. The Lebanese delegation balked at the conditions and, by several accounts, almost walked out. It signed anyway. On paper the agreement is historic: not since 1983 have the two states formally recognised each other’s sovereignty. That should reassure no-one. The agreement of May 1983 was also signed while Israeli troops occupied Lebanon; it was never ratified, and Beirut tore it up within a year. This one, too, is signed under occupation — which is the heart of the problem. In practice it gives Lebanon almost nothing it can hold. Israel agrees to leave only two small “pilot zones.” It keeps the fifth of Lebanon it occupies until Hizbullah is verifiably disarmed — and there is the trap. The agreement is built on a condition that cannot be met. Hizbullah will not be disarmed by force, which has been tried, nor by politics, which has failed for two decades. Neither the Lebanese army nor the Israeli one can deliver it. If the deal cannot be implemented, who benefits from signing it? The answer is Netanyahu. He called the framework “a major achievement for Israel” and a blow to Iran, and lost no time selling it. Israel faces an election by October 27th. His Likud party leads the polls but his coalition is short of a majority, and he had just been embarrassed when Washington and Tehran ended their war without him. The framework lets him claim a victory in the north and a “security zone” defended on his terms, with no obligation to leave. For a prime minister whose fortunes have sagged since the failures of October 7th, it is a timely gift. In Lebanon the agreement was dead on arrival. Naim Qassem, Hezbollah’s leader, pronounced it “null and void.” Hezbollah and its ally Amal, led by the speaker, Nabih Berri, treated it as though it did not exist. Supporters burned tyres and blocked the road to Beirut’s airport. That leaves Aoun and his prime minister, Nawaf Salam, in a strange limbo: holders of a paper that registers Lebanon as a sovereign state, independent of Iran’s bargaining, but commanders of no force that can make the paper real. One actor showed unexpected restraint. After weeks of attacking the Lebanese initiative, Iran did not push its allies into the street battles that many feared. It allowed the anger to simmer rather than boil. Tehran has no interest in a Lebanon that collapses into its own blood while Iran is still recovering from war. The calm is tactical, not friendly. What the agreement really marks is the opening of a new phase in the long quarrel over Hozbollah’s weapons—and over the very sovereignty that Aoun and Salam have staked their futures, and their country’s, upon. The bill for that quarrel is staggering, and it is the part no signing ceremony can wish away. More than a million Lebanese remain displaced. Towns destroyed in vengeance have left families with no homes, no schools, no hospitals to return to. The treasury is empty and the economy is sinking deeper into a crisis that began in 2019, the worst financial collapse in the country’s history, which has wiped out almost all of the lira’s value and pushed more than a third of Lebanese into poverty. The finance minister, Yassine Jaber, puts fresh war damage at no less than $3bn-4bn, on top of some $7bn from the fighting of 2023-24. The World Bank’s reconstruction estimate of $11bn is already out of date and climbing; some officials speak of $20bn-30bn. For a bankrupt state, the figure might as well be written on the moon. For now the war is paused rather than ended, halted by Trump and held in place by his interest, not by any guarantee on the page. Hezbollah follows Tehran’s agenda as stubbornly as ever. Only one man can change the arithmetic: the president who stopped the bombing can also force a real Israeli withdrawal, and turn a hollow document into something Lebanon can use. Until he does, Aoun and Salam are left holding a certificate of sovereignty in a country where sovereignty stops at the edge of the occupied fifth. The Lebanese writer is former editor of Al-Hayat in London and The Daily Star in Beirut.
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The recent launch of the UN Global Alliance for Human Rights marks a significant step in strengthening international efforts to protect human rights by bringing together stakeholders across regions and sectors to address growing global challenges. The new alliance aims to bring tangible change in human rights through four strategic tracks: promoting human rights at home and at work; cultivating a human rights culture; advancing human rights through innovation and technology; and engaging young people in addressing global challenges. In remarks to Qatar News Agency (QNA), Director of the International Cooperation Department at the National Human Rights Committee (NHRC), Amira al-Hadafah, described the Global Alliance for Human Rights as a significant addition and an important strategic step toward strengthening and protecting human rights internationally. She said the NHRC views the alliance as a unique opportunity to enhance cooperation and coordination among national human rights institutions, non-governmental organizations, experts and other stakeholders through a shared vision aimed at bridging gaps between international human rights standards and policies and their implementation in practice, while reinforcing human dignity and promoting justice and equality worldwide. Al-Hadafah said the alliance offers a platform for sharing expertise, best practices, and successful experiences in the field of human rights, while coordinating efforts to address global challenges that hinder the effective realisation of human rights. Regarding the alliance’s potential contribution at a time of widespread human rights violations in conflict zones and areas affected by crises, she said it could make a meaningful difference by documenting violations, facilitating rapid humanitarian responses, and providing victims and their families with a platform to make their voices heard. Such efforts would help transform human rights solidarity from rhetoric into evidence-based institutional action, while drawing greater international attention to serious and widespread violations committed during conflicts, particularly those targeting women and children, she highlighted. Regarding the alliance’s implementation mechanisms and operational tools for translating its principles into tangible results, particularly amid persistent impunity for perpetrators of atrocities and human rights violations, al-Hadafah said impunity remains one of the greatest challenges facing the international human rights system because it contributes to the recurrence of grave violations, especially in armed conflicts, while denying victims, their families and communities effective remedies. She expressed confidence that the alliance could contribute to strengthening accountability and combating impunity through systematic monitoring and documentation, sustained engagement with victims and affected communities, and providing them with a platform to present their experiences and demands for justice before the international community. She added that these efforts could help build global public support for holding perpetrators of serious crimes accountable, establish international advocacy networks, and strengthen cooperation with international mechanisms and courts by providing evidence related to such crimes. Al-Hadafah stressed that the alliance has the potential to generate wide international support for activating international jurisdiction to address the gravest crimes and human rights violations, stemming from the cost of double standards and continued impunity on international peace and security. On the challenges faced by human rights defenders, including harassment and intimidation, she said protecting human rights defenders is among the alliance’s core priorities. She noted that creating a safe and enabling environment for human rights defenders is essential to upholding the rule of law and strengthening respect for human rights within societies. She emphasised that this alliance will strengthen safeguards for human rights defenders through monitoring, establishing an early warning system, providing legal support and protection, and maintaining ongoing coordination with the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders, treaty bodies, and other relevant human rights mechanisms. It will also work to mobilise international support for the effective implementation of the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, with the aim of creating a safe environment for human rights defenders worldwide. Addressing the alliance’s ability to maintain independence from political pressures and secure sustainable funding, Al-Hadafah said, in her concluding remarks, that transparent, multi-stakeholder governance would be a key safeguard for its independence and integrity. She said such governance would enable the alliance to pursue its vision of building a world in which the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and related international instruments are respected, protected and fulfilled, while fostering a strong global civil society capable of monitoring compliance with international human rights obligations and contributing to the advancement of justice. In this context, she added that the alliance is expected to develop a comprehensive strategic plan outlining priorities, strategic partnerships and funding sources, expressing confidence that it is committed to preserving its independence, credibility and freedom from any influence that could compromise its vision, objectives or human rights values.
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The unstoppable run of artificial intelligence — especially since OpenAI’s launch of its hugely successful chatbot, ChatGPT in November 2022 — is bringing about upheavals in the tech world and markets, while becoming a driving force across the global economy. Riding high on the unparalleled global AI boom, Republic of Korea plans to invest nearly $1.2tn - equivalent to more than two-thirds of its GDP — in a new chip-building hub and AI data centres over several years. The enormous cash injection comes as Asia’s fourth-largest economy bets heavily on the technology with Korean memory chipmakers emerging as a crucial cog in the fast-moving industry. “Speed is the only path to survival. We must secure the core elements of artificial intelligence faster than any other nation,” President Lee Jae Myung said in Seoul. Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix will make a record investment of 800tn won (around $520bn) in a new semiconductor fabrication hub in the country’s southwest, the government said. Both companies have seen profits and share prices skyrocket in recent months, as frenzied demand for AI infrastructure squeezes the global supply of memory chips. The government also announced a separate investment of a quadrillion won (around $650bn) in AI data centres over the next 10 years. Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix are also making one of the biggest bets yet on the AI boom with investments worth hundreds of billions of dollars, but the planned capacity buildout is stoking fears of a painful reckoning if AI spending cools. Together, the world’s two biggest memory chipmakers have pledged 3,200tn won ($2.07tn) of investment, encompassing a new 800tn won chip cluster in the country’s southwest as well as previously announced projects. Shares of SK Hynix and Samsung Electronics have gone up 307% and 179%, respectively, so far this year. The announcement comes as customers ranging from AI hyperscalers to electronics makers such as Apple press for more memory chips amid a global shortage. But analysts note that chip plants take years to build and ramp up, meaning much of the new capacity will not arrive until well into the next decade. The memory chip boom also remains reliant on whether AI hyperscalers would keep expanding at the current rate. The soaring profitability of Samsung and SK Hynix’s memory businesses is a relatively recent phenomenon, driven by the global AI boom. Past downturns in chip prices have badly hit the companies, causing SK Hynix to flirt with bankruptcy in 2001 and driving both firms to post big losses in 2023. Still analysts believe the companies would learn from past cycles. “A downturn in the memory industry is clearly a risk to the plan,” CLSA senior analyst Sanjeev Rana said. But “memory producers retain the flexibility to adjust their investment pace if signs of excess capacity emerge.” Global AI adoption continued to rise in the second half of 2025, increasing by 1.2 percentage points compared to the first half of the year, with roughly one in six people worldwide using generative AI tools, according to a Microsoft report. As AI advances, global governance, international collaboration and knowledge-sharing are becoming essential for effective and responsible adoption. Looking forward, these efforts will be critical in addressing the gaps in technology governance, as more countries formalise AI strategies and strengthen their capacity to adopt the technology effectively.
