Alliances in the new world order
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- June 24, 2026
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Vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. Traditional thinking about alliances is outdated in a world increasingly defined by multipolarity and great power competition, technological advances and new methods of war fighting. (Reuters/File Photo) It is never wise to generalize about how different states respond to geopolitical insecurity and instability. Even states in the same region have different economic and security priorities and interests, as well as diverging policy preferences. But they also share a common preoccupation with building up their resilience so that they can absorb or bounce back from a range of security shocks including conventional and hybrid attacks. Alliances have long been the main way for regional states to build up this resilience. At the same time, traditional thinking about alliances is outdated in a world increasingly defined by multipolarity and great power competition, technological advances and new methods of war fighting. All these developments have not reduced the importance of alliances for regional states but they have made it even more important for states to make the right alliance choices. Prime Minister Mark Carney of Canada encapsulated this thinking during his high profile speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January. The end of the “old order”, Carney eloquently warned, demands “building the coalitions that work, issue by issue, with partners who share enough common ground to act together”. This is especially necessary for smaller actors whether in The Americas, Middle East, Asia, Africa, or Europe. These states rely more than ever on security cooperation to navigate regional disorder. Recognition of this has led to the emergence of new types of security alliances with distinct and often novel characterisitics. They differ from traditional alliances like Nato in that they are informal and place low burdens and obligations on members. They also tend to be temporary frameworks, focused on a specific mission or objective. This means that they can be easily disbanded once the mission is over. Importantly, they almost always include a significant operational role for local actors. This is even the case if the US or another powerful extra-regional actor, such as France in Africa, is involved. Existing examples of such alliances include minilaterals like the Quad in the Indian Ocean, the Alliance of Sahel States in Africa and the Saudi-led Yemen War Coalition in the Middle East. These novel frameworks are attempts by regional actors to increase their security options in an increasingly unpredictable strategic environment where uncertainty, including about US intentions, is the only constant. This evolving reality raises an interesting and important question for the future. In what circumstances will regional actors be willing to invest their financial, political, diplomatic and military capital, not to mention their reputations, in these types of security frameworks? For this to happen, regional middle powers with some standing and influence must take the lead. They will need to have a vision of the security benefits of building such frameworks. They will also need to be willing to pay for the privilege of leading what are expensive, and potentially risky and controversial, endeavours. Then they will have the challenging job of convincing other regional actors that such frameworks are a viable and sustainable alternative to the security status quo. This is a difficult task because the downside of more local autonomy tends to be higher levels of vulnerability. This will engender scepticism among prospective members over whether these frameworks can adapt to changing circumstances and reshape regional security architecture in ways that increase security and stability. Even if there is consensus over the benefits of these frameworks, their future adoption will ultimately depend on how disillusioned regional actors are with the US as their security leader. In recent years, decision-makers in Europe, Asia and the Middle East have found it increasingly difficult to reach and maintain a consensus with Washington on a range of critical security issues. We saw this most recently in April after President Donald Trump called for the formation of an international coalition to secure shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. Long-standing allies including Japan, South Korea, France and the UK, as well as most other US partners, either declined outright or refused to commit to provide any meaningful support. Doubts over whether the US has the political will to deliver security in line with past expectations and commitments is also on the rise. As Carney noted in his Davos speech, the “comfortable assumption... [that].. alliance memberships automatically conferred prosperity and security is no longer valid”. In the same month, Denmark’s prime minister, Mette Frederiksen, spoke with regret that “the old world order is now gone”, and wondered out loud if the US would even remain an ally of Europe. This does not mean that regional actors will look to use new security frameworks like those discussed here to establish themselves as the main suppliers ofsecurity and stability in their home regions. Nor will they opt to achieve security by aligning with other extra-regional big powers like Russia and China at the expense of the US. Most long-time US allies in most regions still believe that the US retains significant advantages over its global competitors in matters of defence and security. For this reason, they still view Washington as the necessary, and in some cases the preferred, ally of last resort. Yet we are witnessing changes in the nature of relations between Washington and its global partners on issues of security. For example, many of its long-time partners are more willing than ever before to challenge Washington over its regional security policies. They are also more open than ever to taking into account, and in some circumstances even supporting, the preferences of Washington’s main competitors on important regional security issues. These moves are all relatively new. They are also the inevitable responses of regional actors who recognize the importance of re-imagining their alliance options in an increasingly complex and dangerous international system. The writer is professor of International Politics and director of the Small States and Energy Studies Programs at Georgetown Univeristy in Qatar @RoryDavidMiller
